- Add support in ima_path_check() for integrity checking without
incrementing the counts. (Required for nfsd.)
- rename and export opencount_get to ima_counts_get
- replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_counts_get
- export ima_path_check
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This fixes the problem introduced by commit 3bfacef412 (get rid of
special-casing the /sbin/loader on alpha): osf/1 ecoff binary segfaults
when binfmt_aout built as module. That happens because aout binary
handler gets on the top of the binfmt list due to late registration, and
kernel attempts to execute the binary without preparatory work that must
be done by binfmt_loader.
Fixed by changing the registration order of the default binfmt handlers
using list_add_tail() and introducing insert_binfmt() function which
places new handler on the top of the binfmt list. This might be generally
useful for installing arch-specific frontends for default handlers or just
for overriding them.
Signed-off-by: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
write_lock(¤t->fs->lock) guarantees we can't wrongly miss
LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, this is what we care about. Use rcu_read_lock()
instead of ->siglock to iterate over the sub-threads. We must see
all CLONE_THREAD|CLONE_FS threads which didn't pass exit_fs(), it
takes fs->lock too.
With or without this patch we can miss the freshly cloned thread
and set LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, we don't care.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
[ Fixed lock/unlock typo - Hugh ]
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If do_execve() fails after check_unsafe_exec(), it clears fs->in_exec
unconditionally. This is wrong if we race with our sub-thread which
also does do_execve:
Two threads T1 and T2 and another process P, all share the same
->fs.
T1 starts do_execve(BAD_FILE). It calls check_unsafe_exec(), since
->fs is shared, we set LSM_UNSAFE but not ->in_exec.
P exits and decrements fs->users.
T2 starts do_execve(), calls check_unsafe_exec(), now ->fs is not
shared, we set fs->in_exec.
T1 continues, open_exec(BAD_FILE) fails, we clear ->in_exec and
return to the user-space.
T1 does clone(CLONE_FS /* without CLONE_THREAD */).
T2 continues without LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE while ->fs is shared with
another process.
Change check_unsafe_exec() to return res = 1 if we set ->in_exec, and change
do_execve() to clear ->in_exec depending on res.
When do_execve() suceeds, it is safe to clear ->in_exec unconditionally.
It can be set only if we don't share ->fs with another process, and since
we already killed all sub-threads either ->in_exec == 0 or we are the
only user of this ->fs.
Also, we do not need fs->lock to clear fs->in_exec.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Similar to the mmap data stream, add one that tracks the task COMM field,
so that the userspace reporting knows what to call a task.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090408130409.127422406@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* all changes of current->fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of
old fs->lock
* refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection)
* its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the
same time we decide whether to free it.
* put_fs_struct() is gone
* new field - ->in_exec. Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do
execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct. Cleared when finishing exec
(success and failure alike). Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set.
* check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread
is in progress.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely,
a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way,
they have a health check running lsof every few minutes.
Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient
use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count
has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except
while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check.
[Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier
releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().]
Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>
Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch allows LSM modules to determine whether current process is in an
execve operation or not so that they can behave differently while an execve
operation is in progress.
This patch is needed by TOMOYO. Please see another patch titled "LSM adapter
functions." for backgrounds.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The patch:
commit a6f76f23d2
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to
before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now
calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for
fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the
determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the
pthread library.
However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably
damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where
we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the
determination before calling de_thread().
So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing
our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs
(CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and
so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec().
We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES.
We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the
threads we're going to kill.
This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs
using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If
successful, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
--TEST1--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
exec ./test2
--TEST2--
uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0
SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID
and if unsuccessful, something like:
[dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1
--TEST1--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
exec ./test2
--TEST2--
uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043
ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!
The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as.
[test1.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pthread.h>
static void *thread_func(void *arg)
{
while (1) {}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pthread_t tid;
uid_t uid, euid, suid;
printf("--TEST1--\n");
getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);
if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) {
perror("pthread_create");
exit(1);
}
printf("exec ./test2\n");
execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL);
perror("./test2");
_exit(1);
}
[test2.c]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
uid_t uid, euid, suid;
getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid);
printf("--TEST2--\n");
printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid);
if (euid != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n");
exit(1);
}
printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n");
exit(0);
}
[Makefile]
CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused
all: test1 test2
test1: test1.c
gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread
test2: test2.c
gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c
sudo chown root.root test2
sudo chmod +s test2
Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered
itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly
in the fs directory.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
No one cares do_coredump()'s return value, and also it seems that it
is also not necessary. So make it void.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Untangle the error unwinding in this function, saving a test of local
variable `vma'.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
sys_execve and sys_uselib do not call into fsnotify so inotify does not get
open events for these types of syscalls. This patch simply makes the
requisite fsnotify calls.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... just make it a binfmt handler like #! one.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With all the nameidata removal there's no point anymore for this helper.
Of the three callers left two will go away with the next lookup series
anyway.
Also add proper kerneldoc to inode_permission as this is the main
permission check routine now.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pavel Machek pointed out that performance counters should be flushed
when crossing protection domains on setuid execution.
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: simplify code
de_thread() postpones release_task(leader) until after exit_itimers().
This was needed because !SIGEV_THREAD_ID timers could use ->group_leader
without get_task_struct(). With the recent changes we can release the
leader earlier and simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The patch 6341c39 "tracehook: exec" introduced a small regression in
2.6.27 regarding binfmt_misc exec event reporting. Since the reporting
is now done in the common search_binary_handler() function, an exec
of a misc binary will result in two (or possibly multiple) exec events
being reported, instead of just a single one, because the misc handler
contains a recursive call to search_binary_handler.
To add to the confusion, if PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC is not active, the multiple
SIGTRAP signals will in fact cause only a single ptrace intercept, as the
signals are not queued. However, if PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC is on, the debugger
will actually see multiple ptrace intercepts (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC).
The test program included below demonstrates the problem.
This change fixes the bug by calling tracehook_report_exec() only in the
outermost search_binary_handler() call (bprm->recursion_depth == 0).
The additional change to restore bprm->recursion_depth after each binfmt
load_binary call is actually superfluous for this bug, since we test the
value saved on entry to search_binary_handler(). But it keeps the use of
of the depth count to its most obvious expected meaning. Depending on what
binfmt handlers do in certain cases, there could have been false-positive
tests for recursion limits before this change.
/* Test program using PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC.
This forks and exec's the first argument with the rest of the arguments,
while ptrace'ing. It expects to see one PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop and
then a successful exit, with no other signals or events in between.
Test for kernel doing two PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stops for a binfmt_misc exec:
$ gcc -g traceexec.c -o traceexec
$ sudo sh -c 'echo :test:M::foobar::/bin/cat: > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register'
$ echo 'foobar test' > ./foobar
$ chmod +x ./foobar
$ ./traceexec ./foobar; echo $?
==> good <==
foobar test
0
$
==> bad <==
foobar test
unexpected status 0x4057f != 0
3
$
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
static void
wait_for (pid_t child, int expect)
{
int status;
pid_t p = wait (&status);
if (p != child)
{
perror ("wait");
exit (2);
}
if (status != expect)
{
fprintf (stderr, "unexpected status %#x != %#x\n", status, expect);
exit (3);
}
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t child = fork ();
if (child < 0)
{
perror ("fork");
return 127;
}
else if (child == 0)
{
ptrace (PTRACE_TRACEME);
raise (SIGUSR1);
execv (argv[1], &argv[1]);
perror ("execve");
_exit (127);
}
wait_for (child, W_STOPCODE (SIGUSR1));
if (ptrace (PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child,
0L, (void *) (long) PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC) != 0)
{
perror ("PTRACE_SETOPTIONS");
return 4;
}
if (ptrace (PTRACE_CONT, child, 0L, 0L) != 0)
{
perror ("PTRACE_CONT");
return 5;
}
wait_for (child, W_STOPCODE (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC << 8)));
if (ptrace (PTRACE_CONT, child, 0L, 0L) != 0)
{
perror ("PTRACE_CONT");
return 6;
}
wait_for (child, W_EXITCODE (0, 0));
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
CC: Ulrich Weigand <ulrich.weigand@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.
Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If the coredumping is multi-threaded, format_corename() appends .%pid to
the corename. This was needed before the proper multi-thread core dump
support, now all the threads in the mm go into a single unified core file.
Remove this special case, it is not even documented and we have "%p"
and core_uses_pid.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: La Monte Yarroll <piggy@laurelnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
de_thread() checks if the old leader was the ->child_reaper, this is not
possible any longer. With the previous patch ->group_leader itself will
change ->child_reaper on exit.
Henceforth find_new_reaper() is the only function (apart from
initialization) which plays with ->child_reaper.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This change is Alpha-specific. It adds field 'taso' into struct
linux_binprm to remember if the application is TASO. Previously, field
sh_bang was used for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With MAX_ARG_STRINGS set to 0x7FFFFFFF, and being passed to 'count()' and
compat_count(), it would appear that the current max bounds check of
fs/exec.c:394:
if(++i > max)
return -E2BIG;
would never trigger. Since 'i' is of type int, so values would wrap and the
function would continue looping.
Simple fix seems to be chaning ++i to i++ and checking for '>='.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: "Ollie Wild" <aaw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Just always compile the code when the kernel is modular.
Convert load_nls to use try_then_request_module to tidy
up the code.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
There's a race between mm->owner assignment and swapoff, more easily
seen when task slab poisoning is turned on. The condition occurs when
try_to_unuse() runs in parallel with an exiting task. A similar race
can occur with callers of get_task_mm(), such as /proc/<pid>/<mmstats>
or ptrace or page migration.
CPU0 CPU1
try_to_unuse
looks at mm = task0->mm
increments mm->mm_users
task 0 exits
mm->owner needs to be updated, but no
new owner is found (mm_users > 1, but
no other task has task->mm = task0->mm)
mm_update_next_owner() leaves
mmput(mm) decrements mm->mm_users
task0 freed
dereferencing mm->owner fails
The fix is to notify the subsystem via mm_owner_changed callback(),
if no new owner is found, by specifying the new task as NULL.
Jiri Slaby:
mm->owner was set to NULL prior to calling cgroup_mm_owner_callbacks(), but
must be set after that, so as not to pass NULL as old owner causing oops.
Daisuke Nishimura:
mm_update_next_owner() may set mm->owner to NULL, but mem_cgroup_from_task()
and its callers need to take account of this situation to avoid oops.
Hugh Dickins:
Lockdep warning and hang below exec_mmap() when testing these patches.
exit_mm() up_reads mmap_sem before calling mm_update_next_owner(),
so exec_mmap() now needs to do the same. And with that repositioning,
there's now no point in mm_need_new_owner() allowing for NULL mm.
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix compilation errors on avr32 and without CONFIG_SWAP, introduced by
ba92a43dba ("exec: remove some includes")
In file included from include/asm/tlb.h:24,
from fs/exec.c:55:
include/asm-generic/tlb.h: In function 'tlb_flush_mmu':
include/asm-generic/tlb.h:76: error: implicit declaration of function 'release_pages'
include/asm-generic/tlb.h: In function 'tlb_remove_page':
include/asm-generic/tlb.h:105: error: implicit declaration of function 'page_cache_release'
make[1]: *** [fs/exec.o] Error 1
This straightforward part-revert is nobody's favourite patch to address
the underlying tlb.h needs swap.h needs pagemap.h (but sparc won't like
that) mess; but appropriate to fix the build now before any overhaul.
Reported-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yoichi_yuasa@tripeaks.co.jp>
Reported-by: Haavard Skinnemoen <haavard.skinnemoen@atmel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Tested-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On Mon, May 19, 2008 at 12:01:49AM +0200, Marcin Slusarz wrote:
> open_exec is needlessly indented, calls ERR_PTR with 0 argument
> (which is not valid errno) and jumps into middle of function
> just to return value.
> So clean it up a bit.
Still looks rather messy. See below for a better version.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This moves all the ptrace hooks related to exec into tracehook.h inlines.
This also lifts the calls for tracing out of the binfmt load_binary hooks
into search_binary_handler() after it calls into the binfmt module. This
change has no effect, since all the binfmt modules' load_binary functions
did the call at the end on success, and now search_binary_handler() does
it immediately after return if successful. We consolidate the repeated
code, and binfmt modules no longer need to import ptrace_notify().
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I don't understand why the multi-thread coredump implies the core_uses_pid
behaviour, but we shouldn't use mm->mm_users for that. This counter can
be incremented by get_task_mm(). Use the valued returned by
coredump_wait() instead.
Also, remove the "const char *pattern" argument, format_corename() can use
core_pattern directly.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that we have core_state->dumper list we can use it to wake up the
sub-threads waiting for the coredump completion.
This uglifies the code and .text grows by 47 bytes, but otoh mm_struct
lessens by sizeof(struct completion). Also, with this change we can
decouple exit_mm() from the coredumping code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
binfmt->core_dump() has to iterate over the all threads in system in order
to find the coredumping threads and construct the list using the
GFP_ATOMIC allocations.
With this patch each thread allocates the list node on exit_mm()'s stack and
adds itself to the list.
This allows us to do further changes:
- simplify ->core_dump()
- change exit_mm() to clear ->mm first, then wait for ->core_done.
this makes the coredumping process visible to oom_kill
- kill mm->core_done
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Move the "struct core_state core_state" from coredump_wait() to
do_coredump(), this makes mm->core_state visible to binfmt->core_dump().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Turn core_state->nr_threads into atomic_t and kill now unneeded
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem) in exit_mm().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change zap_process() to return int instead of incrementing
mm->core_state->nr_threads directly. Change zap_threads() to set
mm->core_state only on success.
This patch restores the original size of .text, and more importantly now
->nr_threads is used in two places only.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Move mm->core_waiters into "struct core_state" allocated on stack. This
shrinks mm_struct a little bit and allows further changes.
This patch mostly does s/core_waiters/core_state. The only essential
change is that coredump_wait() must clear mm->core_state before return.
The coredump_wait()'s path is uglified and .text grows by 30 bytes, this
is fixed by the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mm->core_startup_done points to "struct completion startup_done" allocated
on the coredump_wait()'s stack. Introduce the new structure, core_state,
which holds this "struct completion". This way we can add more info
visible to the threads participating in coredump without enlarging
mm_struct.
No changes in affected .o files.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mimi Zohar