Fixes a regression caused by 21edad3220
When file name encryption was enabled, ecryptfs_lookup() failed to use
the encrypted and encoded version of the upper, plaintext, file name
when performing a lookup in the lower file system. This made it
impossible to lookup existing encrypted file names and any newly created
files would have plaintext file names in the lower file system.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/623087
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Some ecryptfs init functions are not prefixed by __init and thus not
freed after initialization. This patch saved about 1kB in ecryptfs
module.
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option provides a unified way of
viewing encrypted eCryptfs files. If the metadata is stored in a xattr,
the metadata is moved to the file header when the file is read inside
the eCryptfs mount. Because of this, we should strip the
ECRYPTFS_METADATA_IN_XATTR flag from the header's flag section. This
allows eCryptfs to treat the file as an eCryptfs file with a header
at the front.
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
We initially read in the first PAGE_CACHE_SIZE of a file to if the
eCryptfs header marker can be found. If it isn't found and
ecryptfs_xattr_metadata was given as a mount option, then the
user.ecryptfs xattr is read into the same buffer. Since the data from
the first page of the file wasn't cleared, it is possible that we think
we've found a second tag 3 or tag 1 packet and then error out after the
packet contents aren't as expected. This patch clears the buffer before
filling it with metadata from the user.ecryptfs xattr.
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch renames the num_header_bytes_at_front variable to
metadata_size since it now contains the max size of the metadata.
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes regression in 8faece5f90
When using the ecryptfs_xattr_metadata mount option, eCryptfs stores the
metadata (normally stored at the front of the file) in the user.ecryptfs
xattr. This causes ecryptfs_crypt_stat.num_header_bytes_at_front to be
0, since there is no header data at the front of the file. This results
in too much memory being requested and ENOMEM being returned from
ecryptfs_write_metadata().
This patch fixes the problem by using the num_header_bytes_at_front
variable for specifying the max size of the metadata, despite whether it
is stored in the header or xattr.
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The "full_alg_name" variable is used on a couple error paths, so we
shouldn't free it until the end.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Errors returned from vfs_read() and vfs_write() calls to the lower
filesystem were being masked as -EINVAL. This caused some confusion to
users who saw EINVAL instead of ENOSPC when the disk was full, for
instance.
Also, the actual bytes read or written were not accessible by callers to
ecryptfs_read_lower() and ecryptfs_write_lower(), which may be useful in
some cases. This patch updates the error handling logic where those
functions are called in order to accept positive return codes indicating
success.
Cc: Eric Sandeen <esandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Returns -ENOTSUPP when attempting to use filename encryption with
something other than a password authentication token, such as a private
token from openssl. Using filename encryption with a userspace eCryptfs
key module is a future goal. Until then, this patch handles the
situation a little better than simply using a BUG_ON().
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Returns an error when an unrecognized cipher code is present in a tag 3
packet or an ecryptfs_crypt_stat cannot be initialized. Also sets an
crypt_stat->tfm error pointer to NULL to ensure that it will not be
incorrectly freed in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat().
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
So, I compiled a 2.6.31-rc5 kernel with ecryptfs and loaded its module.
When it came time to mount my filesystem, I got this in dmesg, and it
refused to mount:
[93577.776637] Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name [aes]; rc = [-2]
[93577.783280] Error attempting to initialize key TFM cipher with name = [aes]; rc = [-2]
[93577.791183] Error attempting to initialize cipher with name = [aes] and key size = [32]; rc = [-2]
[93577.800113] Error parsing options; rc = [-22]
I figured from the error message that I'd either forgotten to load "aes"
or that my key size was bogus. Neither one of those was the case. In
fact, I was missing the CRYPTO_ECB config option and the 'ecb' module.
Unfortunately, there's no trace of 'ecb' in that error message.
I've done two things to fix this. First, I've modified ecryptfs's
Kconfig entry to select CRYPTO_ECB and CRYPTO_CBC. I also took CRYPTO
out of the dependencies since the 'select' will take care of it for us.
I've also modified the error messages to print a string that should
contain both 'ecb' and 'aes' in my error case. That will give any
future users a chance of finding the right modules and Kconfig options.
I also wonder if we should:
select CRYPTO_AES if !EMBEDDED
since I think most ecryptfs users are using AES like me.
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Removed extra newline, 80-char violation]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Lockdep reports the following valid-looking possible AB-BA deadlock with
global_auth_tok_list_mutex and keysig_list_mutex:
ecryptfs_new_file_context() ->
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() ->
mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
-> ecryptfs_add_keysig() ->
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
vs
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() ->
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
-> ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig() ->
mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
ie the two mutexes are taken in opposite orders in the two different
code paths. I'm not sure if this is a real bug where two threads could
actually hit the two paths in parallel and deadlock, but it at least
makes lockdep impossible to use with ecryptfs since this report triggers
every time and disables future lockdep reporting.
Since ecryptfs_add_keysig() is called only from the single callsite in
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(), the simplest fix seems to
be to move the lock of keysig_list_mutex back up outside of the where
global_auth_tok_list_mutex is taken. This patch does that, and fixes
the lockdep report on my system (and ecryptfs still works OK).
The full output of lockdep fixed by this patch is:
=======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2
-------------------------------------------------------
gdm/2640 is trying to acquire lock:
(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81217728>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[<ffffffff8108c897>] check_prev_add+0x2a7/0x370
[<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
[<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[<ffffffff8121526a>] ecryptfs_add_keysig+0x5a/0xb0
[<ffffffff81213299>] ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs+0x59/0xb0
[<ffffffff81214b06>] ecryptfs_new_file_context+0xa6/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8120e42a>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x4a/0x140
[<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
[<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
[<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
[<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
[<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
[<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30
[<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
-> #0 (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[<ffffffff8108c675>] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370
[<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
[<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[<ffffffff812177d5>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81212f49>] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120
[<ffffffff8121306d>] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200
[<ffffffff8120e44b>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140
[<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
[<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
[<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
[<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
[<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
[<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30
[<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by gdm/2640:
#0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8113cb8b>] do_filp_open+0x3cb/0xae0
#1: (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81217728>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2640, comm: gdm Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8108b988>] print_circular_bug_tail+0xa8/0xf0
[<ffffffff8108c675>] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370
[<ffffffff81094912>] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60
[<ffffffff8108cfc1>] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
[<ffffffff81017275>] ? print_context_stack+0x85/0x140
[<ffffffff81089c68>] ? find_usage_backwards+0x38/0x160
[<ffffffff8108d2e7>] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[<ffffffff8108b0b0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x0/0xb0
[<ffffffff815526cd>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[<ffffffff8121591e>] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[<ffffffff8108c02c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0
[<ffffffff81125b0d>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfd/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8108c34d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x14d/0x190
[<ffffffff81552b56>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[<ffffffff8121591e>] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[<ffffffff812177d5>] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81212f49>] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120
[<ffffffff8121306d>] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200
[<ffffffff81210240>] ? ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0x60/0xe0
[<ffffffff8120e44b>] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140
[<ffffffff8120e54d>] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
[<ffffffff8113a7d4>] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
[<ffffffff8113a8c4>] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
[<ffffffff8113d1c1>] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
[<ffffffff8129a93e>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0
[<ffffffff8155410b>] ? _spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40
[<ffffffff81139e9b>] ? getname+0x3b/0x240
[<ffffffff81148a5a>] ? alloc_fd+0xfa/0x140
[<ffffffff8112d8d9>] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
[<ffffffff81553b8f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[<ffffffff8112d9f0>] sys_open+0x20/0x30
[<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In ecryptfs_destroy_inode(), inode_info->lower_file_mutex is locked,
and just after the mutex is unlocked, the code does:
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_inode_info_cache, inode_info);
This means that if another context could possibly try to take the same
mutex as ecryptfs_destroy_inode(), then it could end up getting the
mutex just before the data structure containing the mutex is freed.
So any such use would be an obvious use-after-free bug (catchable with
slab poisoning or mutex debugging), and therefore the locking in
ecryptfs_destroy_inode() is not needed and can be dropped.
Similarly, in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat(), crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex
is locked, and then the mutex is unlocked just before the code does:
memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat));
Therefore taking this mutex is similarly not necessary.
Removing this locking fixes false-positive lockdep reports such as the
following (and they are false-positives for exactly the same reason
that the locking is not needed):
=================================
[ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd3
---------------------------------
inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage.
kswapd0/323 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
(&inode_info->lower_file_mutex){+.+.?.}, at: [<ffffffff81210d34>] ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
{RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
[<ffffffff8108c02c>] mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0
[<ffffffff8108c10f>] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xaf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81125a51>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x41/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8113117a>] get_empty_filp+0x7a/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8112dd46>] dentry_open+0x36/0xc0
[<ffffffff8121a36c>] ecryptfs_privileged_open+0x5c/0x2e0
[<ffffffff81210283>] ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0xa3/0xe0
[<ffffffff8120e838>] ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower+0x278/0x380
[<ffffffff8120f97a>] ecryptfs_lookup+0x12a/0x250
[<ffffffff8113930a>] real_lookup+0xea/0x160
[<ffffffff8113afc8>] do_lookup+0xb8/0xf0
[<ffffffff8113b518>] __link_path_walk+0x518/0x870
[<ffffffff8113bd9c>] path_walk+0x5c/0xc0
[<ffffffff8113be5b>] do_path_lookup+0x5b/0xa0
[<ffffffff8113bfe7>] user_path_at+0x57/0xa0
[<ffffffff811340dc>] vfs_fstatat+0x3c/0x80
[<ffffffff8113424b>] vfs_stat+0x1b/0x20
[<ffffffff81134274>] sys_newstat+0x24/0x50
[<ffffffff81013132>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
irq event stamp: 7811
hardirqs last enabled at (7811): [<ffffffff810c037f>] call_rcu+0x5f/0x90
hardirqs last disabled at (7810): [<ffffffff810c0353>] call_rcu+0x33/0x90
softirqs last enabled at (3764): [<ffffffff810631da>] __do_softirq+0x14a/0x220
softirqs last disabled at (3751): [<ffffffff8101440c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by kswapd0/323:
#0: (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff810f67ed>] shrink_slab+0x3d/0x190
#1: (&type->s_umount_key#35){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff811429a1>] prune_dcache+0xd1/0x1b0
stack backtrace:
Pid: 323, comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd3
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8108ad6c>] print_usage_bug+0x18c/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8108aff0>] ? check_usage_forwards+0x0/0xc0
[<ffffffff8108bac2>] mark_lock_irq+0xf2/0x280
[<ffffffff8108bd87>] mark_lock+0x137/0x1d0
[<ffffffff81164710>] ? fsnotify_clear_marks_by_inode+0x30/0xf0
[<ffffffff8108bee6>] mark_irqflags+0xc6/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8108d337>] __lock_acquire+0x287/0x430
[<ffffffff8108d585>] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[<ffffffff81210d34>] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[<ffffffff8108d2e7>] ? __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[<ffffffff815526ad>] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81210d34>] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[<ffffffff81164710>] ? fsnotify_clear_marks_by_inode+0x30/0xf0
[<ffffffff81210d34>] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[<ffffffff8129a91e>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0
[<ffffffff81552b36>] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[<ffffffff81210d34>] ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[<ffffffff81145d27>] destroy_inode+0x87/0xd0
[<ffffffff81146b4c>] generic_delete_inode+0x12c/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81145832>] iput+0x62/0x70
[<ffffffff811423c8>] dentry_iput+0x98/0x110
[<ffffffff81142550>] d_kill+0x50/0x80
[<ffffffff81142623>] prune_one_dentry+0xa3/0xc0
[<ffffffff811428b1>] __shrink_dcache_sb+0x271/0x290
[<ffffffff811429d9>] prune_dcache+0x109/0x1b0
[<ffffffff81142abf>] shrink_dcache_memory+0x3f/0x50
[<ffffffff810f68dd>] shrink_slab+0x12d/0x190
[<ffffffff810f9377>] balance_pgdat+0x4d7/0x640
[<ffffffff8104c4c0>] ? finish_task_switch+0x40/0x150
[<ffffffff810f63c0>] ? isolate_pages_global+0x0/0x60
[<ffffffff810f95f7>] kswapd+0x117/0x170
[<ffffffff810777a0>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
[<ffffffff810f94e0>] ? kswapd+0x0/0x170
[<ffffffff810773be>] kthread+0x9e/0xb0
[<ffffffff8101430a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20
[<ffffffff81013c90>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30
[<ffffffff81077320>] ? kthread+0x0/0xb0
[<ffffffff81014300>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@digitalvampire.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
ecryptfs_passthrough is a mount option that allows eCryptfs to allow
data to be written to non-eCryptfs files in the lower filesystem. The
passthrough option was causing data corruption due to it not always
being treated as a non-eCryptfs file.
The first 8 bytes of an eCryptfs file contains the decrypted file size.
This value was being written to the non-eCryptfs files, too. Also,
extra 0x00 characters were being written to make the file size a
multiple of PAGE_CACHE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being
specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat
was possible during lookup.
This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into
ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat
will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it.
Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for
finding this bug.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When allocating the memory used to store the eCryptfs header contents, a
single, zeroed page was being allocated with get_zeroed_page().
However, the size of an eCryptfs header is either PAGE_CACHE_SIZE or
ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE (8192), whichever is larger, and is
stored in the file's private_data->crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front
field.
ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents() was using
num_header_bytes_at_front to decide how many bytes should be written to
the lower filesystem for the file header. Unfortunately, at least 8K
was being written from the page, despite the chance of the single,
zeroed page being smaller than 8K. This resulted in random areas of
kernel memory being written between the 0x1000 and 0x1FFF bytes offsets
in the eCryptfs file headers if PAGE_SIZE was 4K.
This patch allocates a variable number of pages, calculated with
num_header_bytes_at_front, and passes the number of allocated pages
along to ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents().
Thanks to Florian Streibelt for reporting the data leak and working with
me to find the problem. 2.6.28 is the only kernel release with this
vulnerability. Corresponds to CVE-2009-0787
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Florian Streibelt <florian@f-streibelt.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The addition of filename encryption caused a regression in unencrypted
filename symlink support. ecryptfs_copy_filename() is used when dealing
with unencrypted filenames and it reported that the new, copied filename
was a character longer than it should have been.
This caused the return value of readlink() to count the NULL byte of the
symlink target. Most applications don't care about the extra NULL byte,
but a version control system (bzr) helped in discovering the bug.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Flesh out the comments for ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(). Remove the
return condition, since it is always 0.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Correct several format string data type specifiers. Correct filename size
data types; they should be size_t rather than int when passed as
parameters to some other functions (although note that the filenames will
never be larger than int).
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
%Z is a gcc-ism. Using %z instead.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(),
and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions.
Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to
inode crypt_stat.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
These functions support encrypting and encoding the filename contents.
The encrypted filename contents may consist of any ASCII characters. This
patch includes a custom encoding mechanism to map the ASCII characters to
a reduced character set that is appropriate for filenames.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived
mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter.
Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should
try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it
decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet
contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename.
Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower
filesystem.
Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the
encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are
already near the maximum filename length.
In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match
against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given
a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name
will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both
encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to
replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random
characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible
to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and
encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random
characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in
any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to
determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the
decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that
directory.
Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development
of this patchset.
This patch:
A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag
70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to
support filename encryption.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When ecryptfs allocates space to write crypto headers into, before copying
it out to file headers or to xattrs, it looks at the value of
crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front to determine how much space it
needs. This is also used as the file offset to the actual encrypted data,
so for xattr-stored crypto info, the value was zero.
So, we kzalloc'd 0 bytes, and then ran off to write to that memory.
(Which returned as ZERO_SIZE_PTR, so we explode quickly).
The right answer is to always allocate a page to write into; the current
code won't ever write more than that (this is enforced by the
(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset) length in the call to
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set). To be explicit about this, we now send
in a "max" parameter, rather than magically using PAGE_CACHE_SIZE there.
Also, since the pointer we pass down the callchain eventually gets the
virt_to_page() treatment, we should be using a alloc_page variant, not
kzalloc (see also 7fcba05437)
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With SLUB debugging turned on in 2.6.26, I was getting memory corruption
when testing eCryptfs. The root cause turned out to be that eCryptfs was
doing kmalloc(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); virt_to_page() and treating that as a nice
page-aligned chunk of memory. But at least with SLUB debugging on, this
is not always true, and the page we get from virt_to_page does not
necessarily match the PAGE_CACHE_SIZE worth of memory we got from kmalloc.
My simple testcase was 2 loops doing "rm -f fileX; cp /tmp/fileX ." for 2
different multi-megabyte files. With this change I no longer see the
corruption.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.25.x, 2.6.26.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes the following sparse warnings:
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1036:8: warning: cast to restricted __be32
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1038:8: warning: cast to restricted __be32
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1077:10: warning: cast to restricted __be32
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1103:6: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1105:6: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1124:8: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1241:21: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1244:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1414:23: warning: cast to restricted __be32
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1417:32: warning: cast to restricted __be16
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove the no longer used ecryptfs_header_cache_0.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Jeff Moyer pointed out that a mount; umount loop of ecryptfs, with the same
cipher & other mount options, created a new ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache item
each time, and the cache could grow quite large this way.
Looking at this with mhalcrow, we saw that ecryptfs_parse_options()
unconditionally called ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(), which is what was adding
these items.
Refactor ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name() to create a new
helper function, ecryptfs_tfm_exists(), which checks for the cipher on the
cached key_tfm_list, and sets a pointer to it if it exists. This can then
be called from ecryptfs_parse_options(), and new key_tfm's can be added
only when a cached one is not found.
With list locking changes suggested by akpm.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Only the lower byte of cipher_code is ever used, so it makes sense
for its type to be u8.
Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The printk statements that result when the user does not have the
proper key available could use some refining.
Signed-off-by: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is no need to keep re-setting the same key for any given eCryptfs inode.
This patch optimizes the use of the crypto API and helps performance a bit.
Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove internal references to header extents; just keep track of header bytes
instead. Headers can easily span multiple pages with the recent persistent
file changes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- make the following needlessly global code static:
- crypto.c:ecryptfs_lower_offset_for_extent()
- crypto.c:key_tfm_list
- crypto.c:key_tfm_list_mutex
- inode.c:ecryptfs_getxattr()
- main.c:ecryptfs_init_persistent_file()
- remove the no longer used mmap.c:ecryptfs_lower_page_cache
- #if 0 the unused read_write.c:ecryptfs_read()
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Thanks to Josef Bacik for finding these.
A couple of ecryptfs error paths don't properly unlock things they locked.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Passing a cipher name > 32 chars on mount results in an overflow when the
cipher name is printed, because the last character in the struct
ecryptfs_key_tfm's cipher_name string was never zeroed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The extent_offset is getting incremented twice per loop iteration through any
given page. It should only be getting incremented once. This bug should only
impact hosts with >4K page sizes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch fixes the errors made in the users of the crypto layer during
the sg_init_table conversion. It also adds a few conversions that were
missing altogether.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Most drivers need to set length and offset as well, so may as well fold
those three lines into one.
Add sg_assign_page() for those two locations that only needed to set
the page, where the offset/length is set outside of the function context.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
The functions that eventually call down to ecryptfs_read_lower(),
ecryptfs_decrypt_page(), and ecryptfs_copy_up_encrypted_with_header()
should have the responsibility of managing the page Uptodate
status. This patch gets rid of some of the ugliness that resulted from
trying to push some of the page flag setting too far down the stack.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace some magic numbers with sizeof() equivalents.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The switch to read_write.c routines and the persistent file make a number of
functions unnecessary. This patch removes them.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Update data types and add casts in order to avoid potential overflow
issues.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Tyler Hicks