The SELinux labeled IPsec code was improperly handling its reference
counting, dropping a reference on a delete operation instead of on a
free/release operation.
Reported-by: Ondrej Moris <omoris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
So far, only net_device * could be passed along with netdevice notifier
event. This patch provides a possibility to pass custom structure
able to provide info that event listener needs to know.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
v2->v3: fix typo on simeth
shortened dev_getter
shortened notifier_info struct name
v1->v2: fix notifier_call parameter in call_netdevice_notifier()
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use call_usermodehelper_setup() + call_usermodehelper_exec() instead of
calling call_usermodehelper_fns(). In case there's an OOM in this last
function the cleanup function may not be called - in this case we would
miss a call to key_put().
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In devcgroup_css_alloc(), there is no longer need for parent_cgroup.
bd2953ebbb("devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchy") made
the variable parent_cgroup redundant. This patch removes parent_cgroup
from devcgroup_css_alloc().
Signed-off-by: Rami Rosen <ramirose@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Passing a pointer to the dentry name, as a parameter to
process_measurement(), causes a race condition with rename() and
is unnecessary, as the dentry name is already accessible via the
file parameter.
In the normal case, we use the full pathname as provided by
brpm->filename, bprm->interp, or ima_d_path(). Only on ima_d_path()
failure, do we fallback to using the d_name.name, which points
either to external memory or d_iname.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Commit 90ba9b1986 (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.
Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.
This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.
Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As reported for linux-next: Tree for Apr 2 (smack)
Add the required include for smackfs.c
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:
# mount server:/export /mnt/test1
# mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
# ls -dZ /mnt/test1
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1
# ls -dZ /mnt/test2
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2
When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.
This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.
Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.
For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:
# mount server:/ /mnt/test1
# mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified
...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.
OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:
# cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
-bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy
The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Change the permission check for yama_ptrace_ptracee to the standard
ptrace permission check, testing if the traceer has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
in the tracees user namespace.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This patch makes exception changes to propagate down in hierarchy respecting
when possible local exceptions.
New exceptions allowing additional access to devices won't be propagated, but
it'll be possible to add an exception to access all of part of the newly
allowed device(s).
New exceptions disallowing access to devices will be propagated down and the
local group's exceptions will be revalidated for the new situation.
Example:
A
/ \
B
group behavior exceptions
A allow "b 8:* rwm", "c 116:1 rw"
B deny "c 1:3 rwm", "c 116:2 rwm", "b 3:* rwm"
If a new exception is added to group A:
# echo "c 116:* r" > A/devices.deny
it'll propagate down and after revalidating B's local exceptions, the exception
"c 116:2 rwm" will be removed.
In case parent's exceptions change and local exceptions are not allowed anymore,
they'll be deleted.
v7:
- do not allow behavior change when the cgroup has children
- update documentation
v6: fixed issues pointed by Serge Hallyn
- only copy parent's exceptions while propagating behavior if the local
behavior is different
- while propagating exceptions, do not clear and copy parent's: it'd be against
the premise we don't propagate access to more devices
v5: fixed issues pointed by Serge Hallyn
- updated documentation
- not propagating when an exception is written to devices.allow
- when propagating a new behavior, clean the local exceptions list if they're
for a different behavior
v4: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo
- separated function to walk the tree and collect valid propagation targets
v3: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo
- update documentation
- move css_online/css_offline changes to a new patch
- use cgroup_for_each_descendant_pre() instead of own descendant walk
- move exception_copy rework to a separared patch
- move exception_clean rework to a separated patch
v2: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo
- instead of keeping the local settings that won't apply anymore, remove them
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Allocate resources and change behavior only when online. This is needed in
order to determine if a node is suitable for hierarchy propagation or if it's
being removed.
Locking:
Both functions take devcgroup_mutex to make changes to device_cgroup structure.
Hierarchy propagation will also take devcgroup_mutex before walking the
tree while walking the tree itself is protected by rcu lock.
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Currently may_access() is only able to verify if an exception is valid for the
current cgroup, which has the same behavior. With hierarchy, it'll be also used
to verify if a cgroup local exception is valid towards its cgroup parent, which
might have different behavior.
v2:
- updated patch description
- rebased on top of a new patch to expand the may_access() logic to make it
more clear
- fixed argument description order in may_access()
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
This patch fixes kernel Oops because of wrong common_audit_data type
in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir().
When SMACK security module is enabled and SMACK logging is on (/smack/logging
is not zero) and you try to delete the file which
1) you cannot delete due to SMACK rules and logging of failures is on
or
2) you can delete and logging of success is on,
you will see following:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002d7
[<...>] (strlen+0x0/0x28)
[<...>] (audit_log_untrustedstring+0x14/0x28)
[<...>] (common_lsm_audit+0x108/0x6ac)
[<...>] (smack_log+0xc4/0xe4)
[<...>] (smk_curacc+0x80/0x10c)
[<...>] (smack_inode_unlink+0x74/0x80)
[<...>] (security_inode_unlink+0x2c/0x30)
[<...>] (vfs_unlink+0x7c/0x100)
[<...>] (do_unlinkat+0x144/0x16c)
The function smack_inode_unlink() (and smack_inode_rmdir()) need
to log two structures of different types. First of all it does:
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
This will set common audit data type to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
and store dentry for auditing (by function smk_curacc(), which in turn calls
dump_common_audit_data(), which is actually uses provided data and logs it).
/*
* You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
*/
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc == 0) {
/*
* You also need write access to the containing directory
*/
Then this function wants to log anoter data:
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
The function sets inode field, but don't change common_audit_data type.
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
So the dump_common_audit() function incorrectly interprets inode structure
as dentry, and Oops will happen.
This patch reinitializes common_audit_data structures with correct type.
Also I removed unneeded
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
initialization, because both dentry and inode pointers are stored
in the same union.
Signed-off-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
Rule modifications are enabled via /smack/change-rule. Format is as follows:
"Subject Object rwaxt rwaxt"
First two strings are subject and object labels up to 255 characters.
Third string contains permissions to enable.
Fourth string contains permissions to disable.
All unmentioned permissions will be left unchanged.
If no rule previously existed, it will be created.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
This fixes audit logs for granting or denial of permissions to show
information about transmute bit.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Special file /smack/revoke-subject will silently accept labels that are not
present on the subject label list. Nothing has to be done for such labels,
as there are no rules for them to revoke.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
The call tree here is:
sk_clone_lock() <- takes bh_lock_sock(newsk);
xfrm_sk_clone_policy()
__xfrm_sk_clone_policy()
clone_policy() <- uses GFP_ATOMIC for allocations
security_xfrm_policy_clone()
security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security()
selinux_xfrm_policy_clone()
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU() defines srcu struct and do init at build time.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU() defines srcu struct and do init at build time.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to
compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an
explicit "access_ok()" check before calling
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when
we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to
fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev().
This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements
should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact,
there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel,
and they both seem to get it wrong:
Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb()
also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through
aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to
be missing. Same situation for
security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov().
I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it,
and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat
counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where
copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so
the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat.
While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values.
And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error
handling.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.
There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.
Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.
THREAD A THREAD B
=============================== ===============================
==>call install_user_keyrings();
if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
==>call install_user_keyrings()
...
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
if (user->uid_keyring)
return 0;
<==
key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]
At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.
The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.
This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.
Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived
list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)
The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter:
hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member)
Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only
they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking
exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate.
Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required:
- Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h
- Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones.
- A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this
was modified to use 'obj->member' instead.
- Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator
properly, so those had to be fixed up manually.
The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here:
@@
iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host;
type T;
expression a,c,d,e;
identifier b;
statement S;
@@
-T b;
<+... when != b
(
hlist_for_each_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_from(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_busy_worker(a, c,
- b,
d) S
|
ax25_uid_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
ax25_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sctp_for_each_hentry(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_from
-(a, b)
+(a)
S
+ sk_for_each_from(a) S
|
sk_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
sk_for_each_bound(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a,
- b,
c, d, e) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
nr_node_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_node_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S
|
for_each_host(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_host_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
for_each_mesh_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
)
...+>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings]
[akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes]
Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit "85865c1 ima: add policy support for file system uuid"
introduced a CONFIG_BLOCK dependency. This patch defines a
wrapper called blk_part_pack_uuid(), which returns -EINVAL,
when CONFIG_BLOCK is not defined.
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:538:4: error: implicit declaration
of function 'part_pack_uuid' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
Changelog v2:
- Reference commit number in patch description
Changelog v1:
- rename ima_part_pack_uuid() to blk_part_pack_uuid()
- resolve scripts/checkpatch.pl warnings
Changelog v0:
- fix UUID scripts/Lindent msgs
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Commit "750943a ima: remove enforce checking duplication" combined
the 'in IMA policy' and 'enforcing file integrity' checks. For
the non-file, kernel module verification, a specific check for
'enforcing file integrity' was not added. This patch adds the
check.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Commit 103a197c0c ("security/device_cgroup: lock assert fails in
dev_exception_clean()") grabs devcgroup_mutex to fix assert failure, but
a mutex can't be grabbed in rcu callback. Since there shouldn't be any
other references when css_free is called, mutex isn't needed for list
cleanup in devcgroup_css_free().
Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jerry.snitselaar@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A patch to fix some unreachable code in search_my_process_keyrings() got
applied twice by two different routes upstream as commits e67eab39be
and b010520ab3 (both "fix unreachable code").
Unfortunately, the second application removed something it shouldn't
have and this wasn't detected by GIT. This is due to the patch not
having sufficient lines of context to distinguish the two places of
application.
The effect of this is relatively minor: inside the kernel, the keyring
search routines may search multiple keyrings and then prioritise the
errors if no keys or negative keys are found in any of them. With the
extra deletion, the presence of a negative key in the thread keyring
(causing ENOKEY) is incorrectly overridden by an error searching the
process keyring.
So revert the second application of the patch.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.
Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.
While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.
Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done
using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Rename hash calculation functions to reflect meaning
and change argument order in conventional way.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Old crypto hash API internally uses shash API.
Using shash API directly is more efficient.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The IMA policy permits specifying rules to enable or disable
measurement/appraisal/audit based on the file system magic number.
If, for example, the policy contains an ext4 measurement rule,
the rule is enabled for all ext4 partitions.
Sometimes it might be necessary to enable measurement/appraisal/audit
only for one partition and disable it for another partition of the
same type. With the existing IMA policy syntax, this can not be done.
This patch provides support for IMA policy rules to specify the file
system by its UUID (eg. fsuuid=397449cd-687d-4145-8698-7fed4a3e0363).
For partitions not being appraised, it might be a good idea to mount
file systems with the 'noexec' option to prevent executing non-verified
binaries.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
EVM uses the same key for all file systems to calculate the HMAC,
making it possible to paste inodes from one file system on to another
one, without EVM being able to detect it. To prevent such an attack,
it is necessary to make the EVM HMAC file system specific.
This patch uses the file system UUID, a file system unique identifier,
to bind the EVM HMAC to the file system. The value inode->i_sb->s_uuid
is used for the HMAC hash calculation, instead of using it for deriving
the file system specific key. Initializing the key for every inode HMAC
calculation is a bit more expensive operation than adding the uuid to
the HMAC hash.
Changing the HMAC calculation method or adding additional info to the
calculation, requires existing EVM labeled file systems to be relabeled.
This patch adds a Kconfig HMAC version option for backwards compatability.
Changelog v1:
- squash "hmac version setting"
Changelog v0:
- add missing Kconfig depends (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Different hooks can require different methods for appraising a
file's integrity. As a result, an integrity appraisal status is
cached on a per hook basis.
Only a hook specific rule, requires the inode to be re-appraised.
This patch eliminates unnecessary appraisals.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
With the new IMA policy 'appraise_type=' option, different hooks
can require different methods for appraising a file's integrity.
For example, the existing 'ima_appraise_tcb' policy defines a
generic rule, requiring all root files to be appraised, without
specfying the appraisal method. A more specific rule could require
all kernel modules, for example, to be signed.
appraise fowner=0 func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
appraise fowner=0
As a result, the integrity appraisal results for the same inode, but
for different hooks, could differ. This patch caches the integrity
appraisal results on a per hook basis.
Changelog v2:
- Rename ima_cache_status() to ima_set_cache_status()
- Rename and move get_appraise_status() to ima_get_cache_status()
Changelog v0:
- include IMA_APPRAISE/APPRAISED_SUBMASK in IMA_DO/DONE_MASK (Dmitry)
- Support independent MODULE_CHECK appraise status.
- fixed IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE/APPRAISED flags
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
In preparation for hook specific appraise status results, increase
the iint flags size.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
The 'security.ima' extended attribute may contain either the file data's
hash or a digital signature. This patch adds support for requiring a
specific extended attribute type. It extends the IMA policy with a new
keyword 'appraise_type=imasig'. (Default is hash.)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy option syntax
Changelog v1:
- Differentiate between 'required' vs. 'actual' extended attribute
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch forbids write access to files with digital signatures, as they
are considered immutable.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Define a new function ima_d_path(), which returns the full pathname.
This function will be used further, for example, by the directory
verification code.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch reduces size of the iint structure by 8 bytes.
It saves about 15% of iint cache memory.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Paul Moore