Using sk->sk_protocol instead of IPPROTO_TCP.
Will be used by DCCPv6 in the next changesets.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
AF_UNIX stream socket performance on P4 CPUs tends to suffer due to a
lot of pipeline flushes from atomic operations. The patch below
removes the sock_hold() and sock_put() in unix_stream_sendmsg(). This
should be safe as the socket still holds a reference to its peer which
is only released after the file descriptor's final user invokes
unix_release_sock(). The only consideration is that we must add a
memory barrier before setting the peer initially.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <benjamin.c.lahaise@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It also looks like there were 2 places where the test on sk_err was
missing from the event wait logic (in sk_stream_wait_connect and
sk_stream_wait_memory), while the rest of the sock_error() users look
to be doing the right thing. This version of the patch fixes those,
and cleans up a few places that were testing ->sk_err directly.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <benjamin.c.lahaise@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch removes dead code. I don't see the reason to keep this cruft
around, besides cluttering the nice and functionally working code.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Nibali <ratz@drugphish.ch>
Signed-off-by: Horms <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since udp_checksum_init always returns 0 there is no point in
having it return a value.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When a packet is obtained from skb_recv_datagram with MSG_PEEK enabled
it is left on the socket receive queue. This means that when we detect
a checksum error we have to be careful when trying to free the packet
as someone could have dequeued it in the time being.
Currently this delicate logic is duplicated three times between UDPv4,
UDPv6 and RAWv6. This patch moves them into a one place and simplifies
the code somewhat.
This is based on a suggestion by Eric Dumazet.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
And make the core DCCP code AF agnostic, just like TCP, now its time
to work on net/dccp/ipv6.c, we are close to the end!
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Renaming it to inet_csk_addr2sockaddr.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
And move it to struct inet_connection_sock. DCCP will use it in the
upcoming changesets.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
And inet6_rsk_offset in inet_request_sock, for the same reasons as
inet_sock's pinfo6 member.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
More work is needed tho to introduce inet6_request_sock from
tcp6_request_sock, in the same layout considerations as ipv6_pinfo in
inet_sock, next changeset will do that.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Another spin of Herbert Xu's "safer ip reassembly" patch
for 2.6.16.
(The original patch is here:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=112281936522415&w=2
and my only contribution is to have tested it.)
This patch (optionally) does additional checks before accepting IP
fragments, which can greatly reduce the possibility of reassembling
fragments which originated from different IP datagrams.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Arthur Kepner <akepner@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This makes ebt_log and ebt_ulog use the new nf_log api. This enables
the bridging packet filter to log packets e.g. via nfnetlink_log.
Signed-off-by: Bart De Schuymer <bdschuym@pandora.be>
Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Part of a performance problem with ip_tables is that memory allocation
is not NUMA aware, but 'only' SMP aware (ie each CPU normally touch
separate cache lines)
Even with small iptables rules, the cost of this misplacement can be
high on common workloads. Instead of using one vmalloc() area
(located in the node of the iptables process), we now allocate an area
for each possible CPU, using vmalloc_node() so that memory should be
allocated in the CPU's node if possible.
Port to arp_tables and ip6_tables by Harald Welte.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Replace existing BIC version 1.1 with new version 2.0.
The main change is to replace the window growth function
with a cubic function as described in:
http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/rhee/export/bitcp/cubic-paper.pdf
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The latest BICTCP patch at:
http://www.csc.ncsu.edu:8080/faculty/rhee/export/bitcp/index_files/Page546.htm
disables the low_utilization feature of BICTCP because it doesn't work
in some cases. This patch removes it.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the SELinux LSM to
create, deallocate, and use security contexts for policies
(xfrm_policy) and security associations (xfrm_state) that enable
control of a socket's ability to send and receive packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable the SELinux LSM to implement access
control on individual packets based on the strongly authenticated
IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing
ones in SELinux based on network interface and IP address. The former
are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using
IPSec, the SELinux can control access to remote hosts based on
cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables
access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote
machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the
access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The patch's main function is to authorize a socket's access to a IPSec
policy based on their security contexts. Since the communication is
implemented by a security association, the patch ensures that the
security association's negotiated and used have the same security
context. The patch enables allocation and deallocation of such
security contexts for policies and security associations. It also
enables copying of the security context when policies are cloned.
Lastly, the patch ensures that packets that are sent without using a
IPSec security assocation with a security context are allowed to be
sent in that manner.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
The function which authorizes a socket to perform a requested
operation (send/receive) on a IPSec policy (xfrm_policy) is
selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup. The Netfilter and rcv_skb hooks ensure
that if a IPSec SA with a securit y association has not been used,
then the socket is allowed to send or receive the packet,
respectively.
The patch implements SELinux function for allocating security contexts
when policies (xfrm_policy) are created via the pfkey or xfrm_user
interfaces via selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc. When a security association
is built, SELinux allocates the security context designated by the
XFRM subsystem which is based on that of the authorized policy via
selinux_xfrm_state_alloc.
When a xfrm_policy is cloned, the security context of that policy, if
any, is copied to the clone via selinux_xfrm_policy_clone.
When a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state is freed, its security context, if
any is also freed at selinux_xfrm_policy_free or
selinux_xfrm_state_free.
Testing:
The SELinux authorization function is tested using ipsec-tools. We
created policies and security associations with particular security
contexts and added SELinux access control policy entries to verify the
authorization decision. We also made sure that packets for which no
security context was supplied (which either did or did not use
security associations) were authorized using an unlabelled context.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.
Patch purpose:
The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.
Patch design approach:
The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.
A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
Patch implementation details:
On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.
The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.
Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.
Testing:
The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.
The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Remove non-existing entry for fat_cvf.txt (was it ever supported?).
Signed-off-by: Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
This patch removes all references to the bouncing address
rddunlap@osdl.org and one dead web page from the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
While looking for where to send trivial patches, I found old contact
information in Documentation/SubmittingPatches.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
This patch for 2.4.x updates the dead email address for 'Mydraal'
and since he no longer wishes to field questions concerning
SysRq or this document removes the statement stating otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Also use the PnP functions to start/stop the devices during the suspend so
that drivers will not have to duplicate this code.
Cc: Adam Belay <ambx1@neo.rr.com>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@suse.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pierre Ossman <drzeus@drzeus.cx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Modules: EMU10K1/EMU10K2 driver
Description:
Part way to fix ALSA bug#927
Add support for the SPI interface on the CA0108 chip.
This is used to control the registers on the DAC.
Headphone output tested.
Other outputs and Capture not tested yet.
Note: The red LED does not come on, but sound is still OK.
Signed-off-by: James Courtier-Dutton <James@superbug.co.uk>
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo