After calling into the lower filesystem to do a rename, the lower target
inode's attributes were not copied up to the eCryptfs target inode. This
resulted in the eCryptfs target inode staying around, rather than being
evicted, because i_nlink was not updated for the eCryptfs inode. This
also meant that eCryptfs didn't do the final iput() on the lower target
inode so it stayed around, as well. This would result in a failure to
free up space occupied by the target file in the rename() operation.
Both target inodes would eventually be evicted when the eCryptfs
filesystem was unmounted.
This patch calls fsstack_copy_attr_all() after the lower filesystem
does its ->rename() so that important inode attributes, such as i_nlink,
are updated at the eCryptfs layer. ecryptfs_evict_inode() is now called
and eCryptfs can drop its final reference on the lower inode.
http://launchpad.net/bugs/561129
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.39+]
Since eCryptfs only calls fput() on the lower file in
ecryptfs_release(), eCryptfs should call the lower filesystem's
->flush() from ecryptfs_flush().
If the lower filesystem implements ->flush(), then eCryptfs should try
to flush out any dirty pages prior to calling the lower ->flush(). If
the lower filesystem does not implement ->flush(), then eCryptfs has no
need to do anything in ecryptfs_flush() since dirty pages are now
written out to the lower filesystem in ecryptfs_release().
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Fixes a regression caused by:
821f749 eCryptfs: Revert to a writethrough cache model
That patch reverted some code (specifically, 32001d6f) that was
necessary to properly handle open() -> mmap() -> close() -> dirty pages
-> munmap(), because the lower file could be closed before the dirty
pages are written out.
Rather than reapplying 32001d6f, this approach is a better way of
ensuring that the lower file is still open in order to handle writing
out the dirty pages. It is called from ecryptfs_release(), while we have
a lock on the lower file pointer, just before the lower file gets the
final fput() and we overwrite the pointer.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1047261
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Artemy Tregubenko <me@arty.name>
Tested-by: Artemy Tregubenko <me@arty.name>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
* ->lookup() never gets hit with . or ..
* dentry it gets is unhashed, so unless we had gone and hashed it ourselves, there's
no need to d_drop() the sucker.
* wrong name printed in one of the printks (NULL, in fact)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pass mount flags to sget() so that it can use them in initialising a new
superblock before the set function is called. They could also be passed to the
compare function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
boolean "does it have to be exclusive?" flag is passed instead;
Local filesystem should just ignore it - the object is guaranteed
not to be there yet.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Just the flags; only NFS cares even about that, but there are
legitimate uses for such argument. And getting rid of that
completely would require splitting ->lookup() into a couple
of methods (at least), so let's leave that alone for now...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The issue occurs when eCryptfs is mounted with a cipher supported by
the crypto subsystem but not by eCryptfs. The mount succeeds and an
error does not occur until a write. This change checks for eCryptfs
cipher support at mount time.
Resolves Launchpad issue #338914, reported by Tyler Hicks in 03/2009.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/338914
Signed-off-by: Tim Sally <tsally@atomicpeace.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
A change was made about a year ago to get eCryptfs to better utilize its
page cache during writes. The idea was to do the page encryption
operations during page writeback, rather than doing them when initially
writing into the page cache, to reduce the number of page encryption
operations during sequential writes. This meant that the encrypted page
would only be written to the lower filesystem during page writeback,
which was a change from how eCryptfs had previously wrote to the lower
filesystem in ecryptfs_write_end().
The change caused a few eCryptfs-internal bugs that were shook out.
Unfortunately, more grave side effects have been identified that will
force changes outside of eCryptfs. Because the lower filesystem isn't
consulted until page writeback, eCryptfs has no way to pass lower write
errors (ENOSPC, mainly) back to userspace. Additionaly, it was reported
that quotas could be bypassed because of the way eCryptfs may sometimes
open the lower filesystem using a privileged kthread.
It would be nice to resolve the latest issues, but it is best if the
eCryptfs commits be reverted to the old behavior in the meantime.
This reverts:
32001d6f "eCryptfs: Flush file in vma close"
5be79de2 "eCryptfs: Flush dirty pages in setattr"
57db4e8d "ecryptfs: modify write path to encrypt page in writepage"
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Thieu Le <thieule@google.com>
Historically, eCryptfs has only initialized lower files in the
ecryptfs_create() path. Lower file initialization is the act of writing
the cryptographic metadata from the inode's crypt_stat to the header of
the file. The ecryptfs_open() path already expects that metadata to be
in the header of the file.
A number of users have reported empty lower files in beneath their
eCryptfs mounts. Most of the causes for those empty files being left
around have been addressed, but the presence of empty files causes
problems due to the lack of proper cryptographic metadata.
To transparently solve this problem, this patch initializes empty lower
files in the ecryptfs_open() error path. If the metadata is unreadable
due to the lower inode size being 0, plaintext passthrough support is
not in use, and the metadata is stored in the header of the file (as
opposed to the user.ecryptfs extended attribute), the lower file will be
initialized.
The number of nested conditionals in ecryptfs_open() was getting out of
hand, so a helper function was created. To avoid the same nested
conditional problem, the conditional logic was reversed inside of the
helper function.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/911507
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
ecryptfs_create() creates a lower inode, allocates an eCryptfs inode,
initializes the eCryptfs inode and cryptographic metadata attached to
the inode, and then writes the metadata to the header of the file.
If an error was to occur after the lower inode was created, an empty
lower file would be left in the lower filesystem. This is a problem
because ecryptfs_open() refuses to open any lower files which do not
have the appropriate metadata in the file header.
This patch properly unlinks the lower inode when an error occurs in the
later stages of ecryptfs_create(), reducing the chance that an empty
lower file will be left in the lower filesystem.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/872905
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Now that a pointer to a valid struct ecryptfs_daemon is stored in the
private_data of an opened /dev/ecryptfs file, the remaining miscdev
functions can utilize the pointer rather than looking up the
ecryptfs_daemon at the beginning of each operation.
The security model of /dev/ecryptfs is simplified a little bit with this
patch. Upon opening /dev/ecryptfs, a per-user ecryptfs_daemon is
registered. Another daemon cannot be registered for that user until the
last file reference is released. During the lifetime of the
ecryptfs_daemon, access checks are not performed on the /dev/ecryptfs
operations because it is assumed that the application securely handles
the opened file descriptor and does not unintentionally leak it to
processes that are not trusted.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
When the eCryptfs mount options do not include '-o acl', but the lower
filesystem's mount options do include 'acl', the MS_POSIXACL flag is not
flipped on in the eCryptfs super block flags. This flag is what the VFS
checks in do_last() when deciding if the current umask should be applied
to a newly created inode's mode or not. When a default POSIX ACL mask is
set on a directory, the current umask is incorrectly applied to new
inodes created in the directory. This patch ignores the MS_POSIXACL flag
passed into ecryptfs_mount() and sets the flag on the eCryptfs super
block depending on the flag's presence on the lower super block.
Additionally, it is incorrect to allow a writeable eCryptfs mount on top
of a read-only lower mount. This missing check did not allow writes to
the read-only lower mount because permissions checks are still performed
on the lower filesystem's objects but it is best to simply not allow a
rw mount on top of ro mount. However, a ro eCryptfs mount on top of a rw
mount is valid and still allowed.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1009207
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Stefan Beller <stefanbeller@googlemail.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
File operations on /dev/ecryptfs would BUG() when the operations were
performed by processes other than the process that originally opened the
file. This could happen with open files inherited after fork() or file
descriptors passed through IPC mechanisms. Rather than calling BUG(), an
error code can be safely returned in most situations.
In ecryptfs_miscdev_release(), eCryptfs still needs to handle the
release even if the last file reference is being held by a process that
didn't originally open the file. ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid() will not
be successful, so a pointer to the daemon is stored in the file's
private_data. The private_data pointer is initialized when the miscdev
file is opened and only used when the file is released.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/994247
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
If the first attempt at opening the lower file read/write fails,
eCryptfs will retry using a privileged kthread. However, the privileged
retry should not happen if the lower file's inode is read-only because a
read/write open will still be unsuccessful.
The check for determining if the open should be retried was intended to
be based on the access mode of the lower file's open flags being
O_RDONLY, but the check was incorrectly performed. This would cause the
open to be retried by the privileged kthread, resulting in a second
failed open of the lower file. This patch corrects the check to
determine if the open request should be handled by the privileged
kthread.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
After we moved inode_sync_wait() from end_writeback() it doesn't make sense
to call the function end_writeback() anymore. Rename it to clear_inode()
which well says what the function really does - set I_CLEAR flag.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference
from user_struct. Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and
instead go straight to cred->user_ns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Fix printk format warning (from Linus's suggestion):
on i386:
fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c:433:38: warning: format '%lu' expects type 'long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'unsigned int'
and on x86_64:
fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c:433:38: warning: format '%u' expects type 'unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'long unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com>
Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
After passing through a ->setxattr() call, eCryptfs needs to copy the
inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode, as they
may have changed in the lower filesystem's ->setxattr() path.
One example is if an extended attribute containing a POSIX Access
Control List is being set. The new ACL may cause the lower filesystem to
modify the mode of the lower inode and the eCryptfs inode would need to
be updated to reflect the new mode.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/926292
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Sebastien Bacher <seb128@ubuntu.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
statfs() calls on eCryptfs files returned the wrong filesystem type and,
when using filename encryption, the wrong maximum filename length.
If mount-wide filename encryption is enabled, the cipher block size and
the lower filesystem's max filename length will determine the max
eCryptfs filename length. Pre-tested, known good lengths are used when
the lower filesystem's namelen is 255 and a cipher with 8 or 16 byte
block sizes is used. In other, less common cases, we fall back to a safe
rounded-down estimate when determining the eCryptfs namelen.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/885744
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The data encryption was moved from ecryptfs_write_end into
ecryptfs_writepage, this patch moves the corresponding function
comments to be consistent with the modification.
Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If pages passed to the eCryptfs extent-based crypto functions are not
mapped and the module parameter ecryptfs_verbosity=1 was specified at
loading time, a NULL pointer dereference will occur.
Note that this wouldn't happen on a production system, as you wouldn't
pass ecryptfs_verbosity=1 on a production system. It leaks private
information to the system logs and is for debugging only.
The debugging info printed in these messages is no longer very useful
and rather than doing a kmap() in these debugging paths, it will be
better to simply remove the debugging paths completely.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/913651
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Daniel DeFreez
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
ecryptfs_read() has been ifdef'ed out for years now and it was
apparently unused before then. It is time to get rid of it for good.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Most filesystems call inode_change_ok() very early in ->setattr(), but
eCryptfs didn't call it at all. It allowed the lower filesystem to make
the call in its ->setattr() function. Then, eCryptfs would copy the
appropriate inode attributes from the lower inode to the eCryptfs inode.
This patch changes that and actually calls inode_change_ok() on the
eCryptfs inode, fairly early in ecryptfs_setattr(). Ideally, the call
would happen earlier in ecryptfs_setattr(), but there are some possible
inode initialization steps that must happen first.
Since the call was already being made on the lower inode, the change in
functionality should be minimal, except for the case of a file extending
truncate call. In that case, inode_newsize_ok() was never being
called on the eCryptfs inode. Rather than inode_newsize_ok() catching
maximum file size errors early on, eCryptfs would encrypt zeroed pages
and write them to the lower filesystem until the lower filesystem's
write path caught the error in generic_write_checks(). This patch
introduces a new function, called ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(), which
checks if the new lower file size is within the appropriate limits when
the truncate operation will be growing the lower file.
In summary this change prevents eCryptfs truncate operations (and the
resulting page encryptions), which would exceed the lower filesystem
limits or FSIZE rlimits, from ever starting.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
ecryptfs_write() handles the truncation of eCryptfs inodes. It grabs a
page, zeroes out the appropriate portions, and then encrypts the page
before writing it to the lower filesystem. It was unkillable and due to
the lack of sparse file support could result in tying up a large portion
of system resources, while encrypting pages of zeros, with no way for
the truncate operation to be stopped from userspace.
This patch adds the ability for ecryptfs_write() to detect a pending
fatal signal and return as gracefully as possible. The intent is to
leave the lower file in a useable state, while still allowing a user to
break out of the encryption loop. If a pending fatal signal is detected,
the eCryptfs inode size is updated to reflect the modified inode size
and then -EINTR is returned.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
ecryptfs_write() can enter an infinite loop when truncating a file to a
size larger than 4G. This only happens on architectures where size_t is
represented by 32 bits.
This was caused by a size_t overflow due to it incorrectly being used to
store the result of a calculation which uses potentially large values of
type loff_t.
[tyhicks@canonical.com: rewrite subject and commit message]
Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yunchuan Wen <wenyunchuan@kylinos.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
ecryptfs_miscdev_read() and ecryptfs_miscdev_write() contained many
magic numbers for specifying packet header field sizes and offsets. This
patch defines those values and replaces the magic values.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Errors in writes to /dev/ecryptfs were being incorrectly reported by
returning 0 or the value of the original write count.
This patch clears up the return code assignment in error paths.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may
result in a a very large kernel memory allocation.
This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the
size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count
value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532
bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Removes unneeded variable initialization in ecryptfs_read_metadata(). Also adds
a small comment to help explain metadata reading logic.
[tyhicks@canonical.com: Pulled out of for-stable patch and wrote commit msg]
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Print inode on metadata read failure. The only real
way of dealing with metadata read failures is to delete
the underlying file system file. Having the inode
allows one to 'find . -inum INODE`.
[tyhicks@canonical.com: Removed some minor not-for-stable parts]
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its
mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent
and it's the only caller of the method
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tyler Hicks