Revert "ANDROID: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open"

Unfork Android.

This reverts commit 8e5e42d5ae20f0324170d01ccf374a1571e82d9b.

Perf_event_paranoid=3 is no longer needed on Android. Access control
of perf events is now done by selinux. See:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11185793/.

Bug: 120445712
Bug: 137092007
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Change-Id: Iba493424174b30baff460caaa25a54a472c87bd4
Git-commit: 44a6aea9c2
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/
Signed-off-by: Srinivasarao P <spathi@codeaurora.org>
tirimbino
Jeff Vander Stoep 5 years ago committed by Gerrit - the friendly Code Review server
parent 6edf689b31
commit 69fc6c9bcf
  1. 4
      Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
  2. 1
      arch/arm64/configs/cuttlefish_defconfig
  3. 1
      arch/x86/configs/x86_64_cuttlefish_defconfig
  4. 5
      include/linux/perf_event.h
  5. 8
      kernel/events/core.c
  6. 9
      security/Kconfig

@ -678,8 +678,7 @@ allowed to execute.
perf_event_paranoid:
Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged
users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 3 if
CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT is set, or 2 otherwise.
users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 2.
-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
@ -687,7 +686,6 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT is set, or 2 otherwise.
Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=3: Disallow all event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
==============================================================

@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT=60
CONFIG_ENABLE_DEFAULT_TRACERS=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT=y
CONFIG_TEST_MEMINIT=y
CONFIG_TEST_STACKINIT=y
CONFIG_SECURITY=y

@ -504,7 +504,6 @@ CONFIG_TEST_STACKINIT=y
CONFIG_IO_DELAY_NONE=y
CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING=y
CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT=y
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y

@ -1207,11 +1207,6 @@ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL 2
#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT 3
static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
{
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
}
static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
{
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;

@ -430,13 +430,8 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask;
* 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
* 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
* 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
* 3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
#else
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
#endif
/* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
@ -10421,9 +10416,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
return -EINVAL;
if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
if (err)

@ -18,15 +18,6 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
depends on PERF_EVENTS
help
If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
changed.
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS

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