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kernel_samsung_sm7125/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c

398 lines
9.1 KiB

/*
* trace event based perf event profiling/tracing
*
* Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat Inc, Peter Zijlstra
perf: Take a hot regs snapshot for trace events We are taking a wrong regs snapshot when a trace event triggers. Either we use get_irq_regs(), which gives us the interrupted registers if we are in an interrupt, or we use task_pt_regs() which gives us the state before we entered the kernel, assuming we are lucky enough to be no kernel thread, in which case task_pt_regs() returns the initial set of regs when the kernel thread was started. What we want is different. We need a hot snapshot of the regs, so that we can get the instruction pointer to record in the sample, the frame pointer for the callchain, and some other things. Let's use the new perf_fetch_caller_regs() for that. Comparison with perf record -e lock: -R -a -f -g Before: perf [kernel] [k] __do_softirq | --- __do_softirq | |--55.16%-- __open | --44.84%-- __write_nocancel After: perf [kernel] [k] perf_tp_event | --- perf_tp_event | |--41.07%-- lock_acquire | | | |--39.36%-- _raw_spin_lock | | | | | |--7.81%-- hrtimer_interrupt | | | smp_apic_timer_interrupt | | | apic_timer_interrupt The old case was producing unreliable callchains. Now having right frame and instruction pointers, we have the trace we want. Also syscalls and kprobe events already have the right regs, let's use them instead of wasting a retrieval. v2: Follow the rename perf_save_regs() -> perf_fetch_caller_regs() Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Cc: Archs <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
15 years ago
* Copyright (C) 2009-2010 Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
BACKPORT: perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org (cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e) [ Ryan Savitski: adapted for older APIs, and folded in upstream ae79d5588a04 (perf/core: Fix !CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS build warnings and failures). This should fix the build errors from the previous backport attempt, where certain configurations would end up with functions referring to the perf_event struct prior to its declaration (and therefore declaring it with a different scope). ] Bug: 137092007 Change-Id: Iece194b3519dc5016ccbe127fc4e5c425ee7c442 Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
5 years ago
#include <linux/security.h>
#include "trace.h"
static char __percpu *perf_trace_buf[PERF_NR_CONTEXTS];
/*
* Force it to be aligned to unsigned long to avoid misaligned accesses
* suprises
*/
typedef typeof(unsigned long [PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)])
perf_trace_t;
/* Count the events in use (per event id, not per instance) */
static int total_ref_count;
static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
BACKPORT: perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org (cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e) [ Ryan Savitski: adapted for older APIs, and folded in upstream ae79d5588a04 (perf/core: Fix !CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS build warnings and failures). This should fix the build errors from the previous backport attempt, where certain configurations would end up with functions referring to the perf_event struct prior to its declaration (and therefore declaring it with a different scope). ] Bug: 137092007 Change-Id: Iece194b3519dc5016ccbe127fc4e5c425ee7c442 Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
5 years ago
int ret;
if (tp_event->perf_perm) {
BACKPORT: perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org (cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e) [ Ryan Savitski: adapted for older APIs, and folded in upstream ae79d5588a04 (perf/core: Fix !CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS build warnings and failures). This should fix the build errors from the previous backport attempt, where certain configurations would end up with functions referring to the perf_event struct prior to its declaration (and therefore declaring it with a different scope). ] Bug: 137092007 Change-Id: Iece194b3519dc5016ccbe127fc4e5c425ee7c442 Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
5 years ago
ret = tp_event->perf_perm(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* We checked and allowed to create parent,
* allow children without checking.
*/
if (p_event->parent)
return 0;
/*
* It's ok to check current process (owner) permissions in here,
* because code below is called only via perf_event_open syscall.
*/
/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) {
BACKPORT: perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org (cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e) [ Ryan Savitski: adapted for older APIs, and folded in upstream ae79d5588a04 (perf/core: Fix !CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS build warnings and failures). This should fix the build errors from the previous backport attempt, where certain configurations would end up with functions referring to the perf_event struct prior to its declaration (and therefore declaring it with a different scope). ] Bug: 137092007 Change-Id: Iece194b3519dc5016ccbe127fc4e5c425ee7c442 Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
5 years ago
ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!is_sampling_event(p_event))
return 0;
/*
* We don't allow user space callchains for function trace
* event, due to issues with page faults while tracing page
* fault handler and its overall trickiness nature.
*/
if (!p_event->attr.exclude_callchain_user)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Same reason to disable user stack dump as for user space
* callchains above.
*/
if (p_event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER)
return -EINVAL;
}
/* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */
if (!(p_event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW))
return 0;
/* Some events are ok to be traced by non-root users... */
if (p_event->attach_state == PERF_ATTACH_TASK) {
if (tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_CAP_ANY)
return 0;
}
/*
* ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
* only allow root to have these.
*/
BACKPORT: perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of limitations: 1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled based on the single value thus making the control very limited and coarse grained. 2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to security issues. This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from userspace. These operations are intended for production systems. 5 new LSM hooks are added: 1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2) syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU, kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl). Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016. 2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access. 3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed. 4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event. 5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/ Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his Suggested-by tag below. To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: jeffv@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: primiano@google.com Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: rsavitski@google.com Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org (cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e) [ Ryan Savitski: adapted for older APIs, and folded in upstream ae79d5588a04 (perf/core: Fix !CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS build warnings and failures). This should fix the build errors from the previous backport attempt, where certain configurations would end up with functions referring to the perf_event struct prior to its declaration (and therefore declaring it with a different scope). ] Bug: 137092007 Change-Id: Iece194b3519dc5016ccbe127fc4e5c425ee7c442 Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
5 years ago
ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
if (ret)
return ret;
return 0;
}
static int perf_trace_event_reg(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
struct hlist_head __percpu *list;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int cpu;
p_event->tp_event = tp_event;
if (tp_event->perf_refcount++ > 0)
return 0;
list = alloc_percpu(struct hlist_head);
if (!list)
goto fail;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(per_cpu_ptr(list, cpu));
tp_event->perf_events = list;
if (!total_ref_count) {
char __percpu *buf;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < PERF_NR_CONTEXTS; i++) {
buf = (char __percpu *)alloc_percpu(perf_trace_t);
if (!buf)
goto fail;
perf_trace_buf[i] = buf;
}
}
ret = tp_event->class->reg(tp_event, TRACE_REG_PERF_REGISTER, NULL);
if (ret)
goto fail;
total_ref_count++;
return 0;
fail:
if (!total_ref_count) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < PERF_NR_CONTEXTS; i++) {
free_percpu(perf_trace_buf[i]);
perf_trace_buf[i] = NULL;
}
}
if (!--tp_event->perf_refcount) {
free_percpu(tp_event->perf_events);
tp_event->perf_events = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static void perf_trace_event_unreg(struct perf_event *p_event)
{
struct trace_event_call *tp_event = p_event->tp_event;
int i;
if (--tp_event->perf_refcount > 0)
goto out;
tp_event->class->reg(tp_event, TRACE_REG_PERF_UNREGISTER, NULL);
/*
* Ensure our callback won't be called anymore. The buffers
* will be freed after that.
*/
tracepoint_synchronize_unregister();
free_percpu(tp_event->perf_events);
tp_event->perf_events = NULL;
if (!--total_ref_count) {
for (i = 0; i < PERF_NR_CONTEXTS; i++) {
free_percpu(perf_trace_buf[i]);
perf_trace_buf[i] = NULL;
}
}
out:
module_put(tp_event->mod);
}
static int perf_trace_event_open(struct perf_event *p_event)
{
struct trace_event_call *tp_event = p_event->tp_event;
return tp_event->class->reg(tp_event, TRACE_REG_PERF_OPEN, p_event);
}
static void perf_trace_event_close(struct perf_event *p_event)
{
struct trace_event_call *tp_event = p_event->tp_event;
tp_event->class->reg(tp_event, TRACE_REG_PERF_CLOSE, p_event);
}
static int perf_trace_event_init(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
int ret;
ret = perf_trace_event_perm(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = perf_trace_event_reg(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = perf_trace_event_open(p_event);
if (ret) {
perf_trace_event_unreg(p_event);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
int perf_trace_init(struct perf_event *p_event)
{
struct trace_event_call *tp_event;
u64 event_id = p_event->attr.config;
int ret = -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(tp_event, &ftrace_events, list) {
if (tp_event->event.type == event_id &&
tp_event->class && tp_event->class->reg &&
try_module_get(tp_event->mod)) {
ret = perf_trace_event_init(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
module_put(tp_event->mod);
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
return ret;
}
void perf_trace_destroy(struct perf_event *p_event)
{
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
perf_trace_event_close(p_event);
perf_trace_event_unreg(p_event);
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
}
int perf_trace_add(struct perf_event *p_event, int flags)
{
struct trace_event_call *tp_event = p_event->tp_event;
struct hlist_head __percpu *pcpu_list;
struct hlist_head *list;
pcpu_list = tp_event->perf_events;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!pcpu_list))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(flags & PERF_EF_START))
p_event->hw.state = PERF_HES_STOPPED;
list = this_cpu_ptr(pcpu_list);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&p_event->hlist_entry, list);
return tp_event->class->reg(tp_event, TRACE_REG_PERF_ADD, p_event);
}
void perf_trace_del(struct perf_event *p_event, int flags)
{
struct trace_event_call *tp_event = p_event->tp_event;
if (!hlist_unhashed(&p_event->hlist_entry))
hlist_del_rcu(&p_event->hlist_entry);
tp_event->class->reg(tp_event, TRACE_REG_PERF_DEL, p_event);
}
void *perf_trace_buf_alloc(int size, struct pt_regs **regs, int *rctxp)
{
char *raw_data;
int rctx;
BUILD_BUG_ON(PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE % sizeof(unsigned long));
if (WARN_ONCE(size > PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE,
"perf buffer not large enough"))
return NULL;
*rctxp = rctx = perf_swevent_get_recursion_context();
if (rctx < 0)
return NULL;
perf: Avoid horrible stack usage Both Linus (most recent) and Steve (a while ago) reported that perf related callbacks have massive stack bloat. The problem is that software events need a pt_regs in order to properly report the event location and unwind stack. And because we could not assume one was present we allocated one on stack and filled it with minimal bits required for operation. Now, pt_regs is quite large, so this is undesirable. Furthermore it turns out that most sites actually have a pt_regs pointer available, making this even more onerous, as the stack space is pointless waste. This patch addresses the problem by observing that software events have well defined nesting semantics, therefore we can use static per-cpu storage instead of on-stack. Linus made the further observation that all but the scheduler callers of perf_sw_event() have a pt_regs available, so we change the regular perf_sw_event() to require a valid pt_regs (where it used to be optional) and add perf_sw_event_sched() for the scheduler. We have a scheduler specific call instead of a more generic _noregs() like construct because we can assume non-recursion from the scheduler and thereby simplify the code further (_noregs would have to put the recursion context call inline in order to assertain which __perf_regs element to use). One last note on the implementation of perf_trace_buf_prepare(); we allow .regs = NULL for those cases where we already have a pt_regs pointer available and do not need another. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141216115041.GW3337@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
10 years ago
if (regs)
*regs = this_cpu_ptr(&__perf_regs[rctx]);
raw_data = this_cpu_ptr(perf_trace_buf[rctx]);
/* zero the dead bytes from align to not leak stack to user */
memset(&raw_data[size - sizeof(u64)], 0, sizeof(u64));
return raw_data;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_trace_buf_alloc);
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(perf_trace_buf_alloc);
void perf_trace_buf_update(void *record, u16 type)
{
struct trace_entry *entry = record;
int pc = preempt_count();
unsigned long flags;
local_save_flags(flags);
tracing_generic_entry_update(entry, flags, pc);
entry->type = type;
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(perf_trace_buf_update);
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
static void
perf_ftrace_function_call(unsigned long ip, unsigned long parent_ip,
struct ftrace_ops *ops, struct pt_regs *pt_regs)
{
perf/ftrace: Fix double traces of perf on ftrace:function When running perf on the ftrace:function tracepoint, there is a bug which can be reproduced by: perf record -e ftrace:function -a sleep 20 & perf record -e ftrace:function ls perf script ls 10304 [005] 171.853235: ftrace:function: perf_output_begin ls 10304 [005] 171.853237: ftrace:function: perf_output_begin ls 10304 [005] 171.853239: ftrace:function: task_tgid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853240: ftrace:function: task_tgid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853242: ftrace:function: __task_pid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853244: ftrace:function: __task_pid_nr_ns We can see that all the function traces are doubled. The problem is caused by the inconsistency of the register function perf_ftrace_event_register() with the probe function perf_ftrace_function_call(). The former registers one probe for every perf_event. And the latter handles all perf_events on the current cpu. So when two perf_events on the current cpu, the traces of them will be doubled. So this patch adds an extra parameter "event" for perf_tp_event, only send sample data to this event when it's not NULL. Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1503668977-12526-1-git-send-email-zhouchengming1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
7 years ago
struct perf_event *event;
struct ftrace_entry *entry;
struct hlist_head *head;
struct pt_regs regs;
int rctx;
head = this_cpu_ptr(event_function.perf_events);
if (hlist_empty(head))
return;
#define ENTRY_SIZE (ALIGN(sizeof(struct ftrace_entry) + sizeof(u32), \
sizeof(u64)) - sizeof(u32))
BUILD_BUG_ON(ENTRY_SIZE > PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE);
memset(&regs, 0, sizeof(regs));
perf_fetch_caller_regs(&regs);
entry = perf_trace_buf_alloc(ENTRY_SIZE, NULL, &rctx);
if (!entry)
return;
entry->ip = ip;
entry->parent_ip = parent_ip;
perf/ftrace: Fix double traces of perf on ftrace:function When running perf on the ftrace:function tracepoint, there is a bug which can be reproduced by: perf record -e ftrace:function -a sleep 20 & perf record -e ftrace:function ls perf script ls 10304 [005] 171.853235: ftrace:function: perf_output_begin ls 10304 [005] 171.853237: ftrace:function: perf_output_begin ls 10304 [005] 171.853239: ftrace:function: task_tgid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853240: ftrace:function: task_tgid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853242: ftrace:function: __task_pid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853244: ftrace:function: __task_pid_nr_ns We can see that all the function traces are doubled. The problem is caused by the inconsistency of the register function perf_ftrace_event_register() with the probe function perf_ftrace_function_call(). The former registers one probe for every perf_event. And the latter handles all perf_events on the current cpu. So when two perf_events on the current cpu, the traces of them will be doubled. So this patch adds an extra parameter "event" for perf_tp_event, only send sample data to this event when it's not NULL. Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1503668977-12526-1-git-send-email-zhouchengming1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
7 years ago
event = container_of(ops, struct perf_event, ftrace_ops);
perf_trace_buf_submit(entry, ENTRY_SIZE, rctx, TRACE_FN,
perf/ftrace: Fix double traces of perf on ftrace:function When running perf on the ftrace:function tracepoint, there is a bug which can be reproduced by: perf record -e ftrace:function -a sleep 20 & perf record -e ftrace:function ls perf script ls 10304 [005] 171.853235: ftrace:function: perf_output_begin ls 10304 [005] 171.853237: ftrace:function: perf_output_begin ls 10304 [005] 171.853239: ftrace:function: task_tgid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853240: ftrace:function: task_tgid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853242: ftrace:function: __task_pid_nr_ns ls 10304 [005] 171.853244: ftrace:function: __task_pid_nr_ns We can see that all the function traces are doubled. The problem is caused by the inconsistency of the register function perf_ftrace_event_register() with the probe function perf_ftrace_function_call(). The former registers one probe for every perf_event. And the latter handles all perf_events on the current cpu. So when two perf_events on the current cpu, the traces of them will be doubled. So this patch adds an extra parameter "event" for perf_tp_event, only send sample data to this event when it's not NULL. Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1503668977-12526-1-git-send-email-zhouchengming1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
7 years ago
1, &regs, head, NULL, event);
#undef ENTRY_SIZE
}
static int perf_ftrace_function_register(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct ftrace_ops *ops = &event->ftrace_ops;
ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_PER_CPU | FTRACE_OPS_FL_RCU;
ops->func = perf_ftrace_function_call;
return register_ftrace_function(ops);
}
static int perf_ftrace_function_unregister(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct ftrace_ops *ops = &event->ftrace_ops;
ftrace, perf: Add filter support for function trace event Adding support to filter function trace event via perf interface. It is now possible to use filter interface in the perf tool like: perf record -e ftrace:function --filter="(ip == mm_*)" ls The filter syntax is restricted to the the 'ip' field only, and following operators are accepted '==' '!=' '||', ending up with the filter strings like: ip == f1[, ]f2 ... || ip != f3[, ]f4 ... with comma ',' or space ' ' as a function separator. If the space ' ' is used as a separator, the right side of the assignment needs to be enclosed in double quotes '"', e.g.: perf record -e ftrace:function --filter '(ip == do_execve,sys_*,ext*)' ls perf record -e ftrace:function --filter '(ip == "do_execve,sys_*,ext*")' ls perf record -e ftrace:function --filter '(ip == "do_execve sys_* ext*")' ls The '==' operator adds trace filter with same effect as would be added via set_ftrace_filter file. The '!=' operator adds trace filter with same effect as would be added via set_ftrace_notrace file. The right side of the '!=', '==' operators is list of functions or regexp. to be added to filter separated by space. The '||' operator is used for connecting multiple filter definitions together. It is possible to have more than one '==' and '!=' operators within one filter string. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1329317514-8131-8-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
13 years ago
int ret = unregister_ftrace_function(ops);
ftrace_free_filter(ops);
return ret;
}
static void perf_ftrace_function_enable(struct perf_event *event)
{
ftrace_function_local_enable(&event->ftrace_ops);
}
static void perf_ftrace_function_disable(struct perf_event *event)
{
ftrace_function_local_disable(&event->ftrace_ops);
}
int perf_ftrace_event_register(struct trace_event_call *call,
enum trace_reg type, void *data)
{
switch (type) {
case TRACE_REG_REGISTER:
case TRACE_REG_UNREGISTER:
break;
case TRACE_REG_PERF_REGISTER:
case TRACE_REG_PERF_UNREGISTER:
return 0;
case TRACE_REG_PERF_OPEN:
return perf_ftrace_function_register(data);
case TRACE_REG_PERF_CLOSE:
return perf_ftrace_function_unregister(data);
case TRACE_REG_PERF_ADD:
perf_ftrace_function_enable(data);
return 0;
case TRACE_REG_PERF_DEL:
perf_ftrace_function_disable(data);
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER */